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A COMMENT ON SHERRY’S “JUDICIAL ACTIVISM”

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

P

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl†
ROFESSOR SUZANNA SHERRY IS ONE

of our best scholars of
constitutional law and the federal courts. Her recent paper, the subject of this micro-symposium, advances the
provocative prescription that “we should encourage more
judicial activism, not less.” My comments focus on the pragmatic
portion of her argument, in which she contends that our actual experience with judicial review demonstrates the need for more activism. Although Professor Sherry’s paper is enlightening throughout, I
do not think this important portion succeeds in making the case for
more activism.
One could quarrel with Professor Sherry’s diagnosis of an activism deficiency on several grounds. One might question whether
studying the worst-of-the-worst cases and isolating their common
feature is the right method for reaching conclusions about broader
patterns. (Compare: Suppose the worst outcomes in the treatment
of prostate cancer occur when the doctor fails to remove a prostate
harboring an aggressive tumor. Does it follow that doctors should,
as a rule, bias their judgments in favor of more surgeries?) Further,
one wonders whether her metric for discerning the worst of the
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worst – namely, universal condemnation – reliably discovers the
worst decisions qua decisions or instead tends to identify old decisions emblematic of shameful social practices that, looking back, we
wish someone had stopped.
If we set aside those kinds of worries, there remains one larger
objection. Let us grant that the actual practice of judicial review
shows that more activism would have been beneficial in the past.
That does not necessarily make more activism the right prescription
for the future. The conditions that will prevail in the future need
not resemble those of the past. One is reminded of the Thanksgiving
turkey, reliably fed each morning by the (seemingly) friendly farmer
– until the day he wasn’t.
There is, in fact, some reason to think that the greater risk going
forward is judicial hyperactivity. For decades now the Supreme
Court has been plenty comfortable with its power of judicial review. Consider, just from the last few years: the invalidation of a
critical portion of the Voting Rights Act, the invalidation of DOMA,
the invalidation of the Medicaid expansion on Spending Clause
grounds, Citizens United, Boumediene. (It is notable that Professor
Sherry’s last example of condemned inactivism is from the 1940s.)
The Court, on both the right and the left, has already taken Professor Sherry’s instructions to heart.
In addition to considering the non-deferential disposition of the
modern Supreme Court, one should weigh other institutional circumstances. The parties are polarized. Congress is sclerotic, some
say broken. Federal judges serve increasingly long terms. These and
other factors suggest, in different ways, that our system is currently
susceptible to experiencing, and not well tolerating, high doses of
activism.
To be clear, whether we need more activism is a question I cannot definitively answer (certainly not here!). But the past, even if
we have rightly evaluated it, cannot answer that question either.
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